An international conference titled “Constantinople and Moscow. The Transformation of Church Allegiance and the Influence of Imperial Policy” took place in Vilnius. Participants discussed mechanisms for the instrumentalization of religion, the role of the Russian Orthodox Church in advancing Moscow’s geopolitical interests, and possible ways to counter Russian hybrid influence while respecting religious rights and freedoms. This included the context of the canonical protectorate of the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople.

The conference in Vilnius initiated, for the first time, a serious discussion of these issues in the Lithuanian context. These include the functioning in the country of two parallel Orthodox jurisdictions, the Moscow Patriarchate and the Constantinople Patriarchate, as well as the monopoly rights of the Lithuanian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate to own and use religious buildings, Orthodox churches, throughout Lithuania.

Participants in the conference included scholars, politicians, diplomats, public figures, theologians, and members of the clergy from the Ecumenical Patriarchate, Lithuania, Estonia, and Ukraine. They discussed not only the theological and legal aspects of what was called “the Orthodox question in Lithuania” but also possible practical mechanisms that could limit Russia’s further influence on Lithuania’s religious environment and contribute to the restoration of historical justice. The concept discussed was an independent Lithuanian Church free from Moscow in Lithuanian churches free from Moscow.

A “RUSSIAN GHETTO FOR LITHUANIA” WAS CREATED WITHIN THE MOSCOW PATRIARCHATE

Priest Gintaras Sungaila of the Lithuanian Exarchate of the Constantinople Patriarchate, one of the first Lithuanian priests who sought to distance the Lithuanian Church from Moscow after Russia’s military aggression against Ukraine and was expelled from the Russian Church for that reason, described how what he called a “Russian ghetto” has been forming within the Lithuanian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate.

“The ideology of the ‘Russian world’ is presented there partly through interpretations of history. The history of the Church in Lithuania and the history of Lithuania itself are described as the history of Russia. Until 2022, when I was still a student, we traveled to children’s camps in Moscow and met with officials from the Russian presidential administration. After 2022 much of that statistical record was ‘cleaned up’. Websites and databases disappeared and archives became difficult to locate,” Gintaras said.

The priest also said that in “lessons of faith,” as he described them, a pro Russian identity was formed among Lithuanians. Parish textbooks included narratives about “Holy Rus” and the “great Russian clergy.” According to him, the Lithuanian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate encouraged Lithuanian children to study in Russian schools and to become involved in the Russian Church. As he described it, it was normal there to communicate only in Russian, not to know the Lithuanian language, and later to leave for studies in Moscow or Saint Petersburg.

For Lithuanian believers of Greek origin, problems arose earlier. After Ukraine received church independence from Moscow through the Ecumenical Throne, in 2019 the Russian Church announced that it was breaking canonical communion with the Constantinople Patriarchate. According to Evelina Paulevičienė, chair of the Lithuanian Greek community, in implementing Moscow’s decision the Lithuanian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate stopped giving communion to Lithuanian Greeks and in some cases refused to perform baptisms. In her view this violated the rights of believers and worsened interconfessional relations in Lithuania.

She said that in order to overcome such religious inequality and free themselves from ecclesiastical dependence on Moscow, the Lithuanian Exarchate of the Ecumenical Patriarchate was established in 2024 with the active participation not only of Lithuanian priests but also of Greeks, the Ukrainian diaspora, and other national communities of Lithuania.

IS LITHUANIA READY TO HAND OVER ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND ORTHODOX BELIEVERS TO THE LITHUANIAN BRANCH OF THE RUSSIAN CHURCH. A SEARCH FOR A COMPROMISE SOLUTION

Since 2022 Orthodox communities in Lithuania, as noted at the conference, have been actively growing due to Ukrainian refugees and displaced persons as well as Belarusians. Participants suggested that the current eighty thousand Ukrainians may not be the limit and that the number could reach one hundred thousand.

In this context it was argued that earlier statistical data showing that 3.5 percent of Lithuania’s population was Orthodox is now outdated. The number of Orthodox believers in the country is now significantly higher and they influence the cultural and socio political environment.

According to another priest of the Constantinople Patriarchate in Lithuania, Father Vladimir, today seventy percent of parishioners of the Lithuanian Orthodox Church within the Moscow Patriarchate support Russia and view ideas that Moscow “has a right” to Ukraine, the Baltic region, and Poland with loyalty.

Is Lithuania ready to “hand over” its growing Orthodox population to the influence of the Lithuanian branch of the Russian Church. What position should Lithuania take toward this pro Moscow confession, defensive or offensive, and what should be the desired outcome. These were the questions framing the final discussion of the forum, moderated by Vytautas Bruveris, a journalist familiar with the subject of hybrid warfare and its religious dimension.

“We know that the Moscow Patriarchate has legal ties with Russian state structures, including agreements with the Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Education. In essence it functions as a subdivision of that state. This contradicts Lithuania’s national security interests,” said producer and journalist Edmundas Jakilaitis at the conference.

“Earlier France reconsidered its attitude toward Russian ‘journalists,’ viewing them as representatives of the state. By the same logic the leadership of the Moscow Patriarchate in Moscow should be regarded as a state institution.”

Philosopher, cultural scholar, and diplomat Vytautas Ališauskas noted that it is legally difficult to prove a pro Russian position of Lithuanian communities of the Moscow Patriarchate because formally they support a “pro Lithuanian line,” avoid discussing Russia’s military aggression, and refrain from explicit pro Russian propaganda in public.

According to him, for example, on February 16, Lithuania’s Independence Day, “it seemed that nowhere did people pray for Lithuania as fervently as in the Russian parishes.”

At the same time, as Father Vladimir of the Lithuanian Exarchate noted, the church has its own specific language, veiled narratives, and methods of influence that need to be recognized. As an example he cited the practice of praying for Moscow Patriarch Kirill in Lithuanian Orthodox churches, where he is called “our great lord and father,” which in his opinion indicates subordination to the Moscow throne.

“The Moscow Church has never been free from its connection with the state. Therefore the subordination of a local Orthodox church to the Moscow center is not simply a spiritual link or a tribute to tradition. It means that the local church is subordinated to the apparatus of the Russian state,” said Metropolitan Yevstratii, a speaker of the Orthodox Church of Ukraine.

His words were voiced against the background of remarks that in Ukraine the number of priests of the Moscow Patriarchate who are Russian collaborators or suspects in treason is counted in the hundreds.

“If Patriarch Kirill Gundyaev calls the war ‘sacred,’ the position becomes obvious. We must be very cautious and understand that the Russian Orthodox Church in Lithuania is not simply ‘a small church next door,’” Evelina Paulevičienė noted.

Two conference speakers who were diplomats also stated that Lithuania consistently supported the introduction of sanctions against Moscow Patriarch Kirill Gundyaev, but that Hungary blocked these sanctions each time.

LITHUANIA WITHOUT THE INFLUENCE OF THE MOSCOW PATRIARCHATE

How can a system be created in which the Moscow Patriarchate will have no influence in Lithuania. This question was raised by Edmundas Jakilaitis, who noted that the presence of the Moscow jurisdiction is not only a matter of spiritual care but also a matter of resources, land, and church buildings.

“I believe the state should not finance the Moscow Patriarchate, which in Lithuania is called the ‘Lithuanian Orthodox Church.’ It is the same structure subordinated to Kirill, the Patriarch of Moscow. Why are we subsidizing it,” said Evelina Paulevičienė.

“The weak side, meaning the small but independent Lithuanian Exarchate, should receive not proportionally but more than proportionally. The ‘Moscow side’ already has every opportunity and a great deal of property, so state support is less necessary for them,” supported diplomat Vytautas Ališauskas.

Conference participants agreed that the Lithuanian Exarchate of the Constantinople Patriarchate should be supported. According to them, the ability of the exarchate clergy to conduct services in full churches together with believers could significantly change the situation.

“People need an environment, a place, a sense of representation. They do not always want to go, for example, to the chapel in the former Lukiškės prison where services are now held. They want to hold baptisms, weddings, and similar ceremonies in a dignified and appropriate place. And here we encounter a new issue, property and so on. One cannot be solved without the other. Saying ‘give them a plot of land and let them start a hundred year construction project’ simply postpones the solution far into the future,” said Vytautas Ališauskas.

Questions concerning property rights to church real estate of Orthodox Lithuanian communities remain sensitive because all church buildings in Lithuania were transferred to the Lithuanian Church of the Moscow Patriarchate as part of the restitution process.

At that time, as noted in the discussion, the position and rhetoric of the Russian Church did not appear as openly imperial and expansionist as they do today.

Vytautas Bruveris voiced the idea that the state could ask the Lithuanian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate to voluntarily transfer part of the churches and other real estate it currently controls to the Lithuanian Church of the Ecumenical Patriarchate.

In response Edmundas Jakilaitis remarked that “no one will come voluntarily and suddenly give something away.” He emphasized that all church buildings are under the jurisdiction of Lithuania.

“This is a space regarding which the state must also take a position. And that position can later turn into decisions.”

“Lithuania is a state governed by the rule of law. In this case it is difficult to imagine taking away property that has belonged to someone for decades. That would be unprecedented,” Vytautas Ališauskas objected.

“Then let us acknowledge that while recognizing the national security threat posed by the Moscow Patriarchate and understanding that this structure conducts imperial propaganda in Lithuania, we cannot do much about it if we wish to remain a legal and democratic state,” the moderator responded.

Metropolitan Yevstratii explained how, according to him, this issue is addressed in Ukraine. Property belongs not to the “church as an institution” but to a specific religious community.

He explained that the church as such does not have the status of a legal entity, while the community does. At a meeting the community decides which jurisdiction to belong to while retaining ownership of its property.

The discussion at the Vilnius conference was summarized by Edmundas Jakilaitis.

“We agree that we do not have facts to bring accusations against the clergy of the Lithuanian Orthodox Church subordinated to the Moscow Patriarchate regarding the content of their sermons. But the problem remains. Their church leadership is subordinate to Moscow, which is hostile to the goals of our state and where the leadership of the church effectively speaks as a state authority.

It would be best if the church of Lithuania that is subordinate to the Moscow Patriarchate made its own decision. While discussing all the topics raised here we should say that the state will move toward a certain status anyway. Perhaps we could hope for a response that would begin a new conversation.”

TO BE CONTINUED

At the international conference in Vilnius Lithuanian and foreign elites raised these issues in the context of national interests while trying to find a balance between the tasks of state security and the protection of religious rights and freedoms. At the same time it was noted that rights and freedoms must be distinguished from abuse and speculation.

The final note came from one of the conference organizers, historian Alvydas Nikžentaitis.

“War clarifies the picture in a very powerful way. This conversation must not end. Now this topic cannot be pushed to the margins of public attention. I think the Orthodox of Lithuania belonging to the Constantinople Patriarchate are ready to continue the line of this conference. And we will invite you very soon to the next one. We are not saying goodbye.”

Based on materials from the publication Delfi