This article is reproduced with the permission of its author, Reneta Trifonova. It was originally published in the publication she heads, Christianity.bg.

Church property, diplomatic gestures and peace initiatives. Could these developments conceal an attempt to establish a new centre of influence in the Orthodox world? And why does Ukraine remain in the background?

The Orthodox world is experiencing something more profound than another period of tensions between Churches. Following the Ukrainian church dispute, the rupture between Moscow and Constantinople, and against the backdrop of Russia’s continuing war against Ukraine, a struggle over authority, influence and the right to mediate in church diplomacy is becoming increasingly apparent. Yet when mediation concerns a war that has claimed more than a million lives and casualties, including those killed and wounded, the moral dimension of such mediation must also be considered.

The meeting between Patriarch Theophilos III of Jerusalem, Vladimir Putin and Patriarch Kirill in Moscow on 5 November 2026 therefore cannot be regarded merely as a ceremonial visit or an isolated gesture in support of peace. It must be placed within the broader context of Russia’s presence in the Holy Land, relations among the ancient Patriarchates, and Constantinople’s efforts to preserve its coordinating role and primacy of honour in interchurch relations.

Such meetings, together with the convergence of developments involving church property, diplomacy and politics, raise questions that cannot be ignored.

A Message of Peace and Uncomfortable Questions

During the meeting at the Kremlin, the Russian president presented the Patriarch of Jerusalem with the Order of Friendship, an award conferred by presidential decree on 17 November 2025 in recognition of his contribution to strengthening friendship, cooperation and spiritual ties with the Russian Federation.

However, Theophilos III’s public statements during the award ceremony raise a series of uncomfortable questions. He expressed admiration for Putin, described him as a defender of the Orthodox faith and said that he prayed for his health. He also offered to help facilitate dialogue between Russia and Ukraine.

This is how Andrei Kolesnikov, a special correspondent for Kommersant, described the proceedings in an article entitled “The Patriarch’s Silence”:

“Theophilos III spoke at great length and without pausing, so the interpretation continued uninterrupted from the beginning of his speech to the end (the interpreter, incidentally, had an extremely difficult task, but ultimately proved herself a true virtuoso):

‘We are the guarantors that Jerusalem will remain a multireligious city, a mosaic of the many faiths represented there, so that they may coexist in peace and mutual understanding. In this way, we demonstrate to the whole world this model of mutual respect, as Scripture says: “A city set on a hill cannot be hidden.” Just as the Holy Fire descends every year on Holy Saturday, so we carry this light into the world!'”

Vladimir Putin nodded appreciatively.

“We know that various proposals for negotiations to resolve the situation on your country’s western borders are currently on the table,” Patriarch Theophilos III continued.

In other words, he described the war in Ukraine as a “situation”. Well, let God be his judge.

“As the spiritual leader of all the Christian denominations represented in Jerusalem… My task is to listen to those around us, to those who seek to live in peace… We are ready to offer our assistance and fully support any efforts aimed at helping to achieve peace between brothers… Thank you for receiving us today. Every day we pray for you in the house of the Lord!”

There is scarcely anything to add. The Patriarch of Jerusalem speaks for himself. Particularly revealing, however, is the way he refers to the war as a “situation on Russia’s western borders” rather than explicitly acknowledging Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.

Ukrainian media paid particular attention to this expression. Nor is there any public confirmation that Kyiv authorised the Patriarch of Jerusalem to represent the Ukrainian side in such negotiations. Peace, however, requires recognition of the causes of the war, responsibility for aggression and Ukraine’s right to determine its own future.

Theophilos III’s public statements do not provide sufficient grounds to conclude that the visit was organised exclusively to secure political agreements. The Patriarch of Jerusalem is not known as a significant mediator or an influential church diplomat in peace negotiations. Indeed, the meeting left the impression that he had volunteered his services.

Nevertheless, his proximity to the Kremlin, the prestigious award and the way the war was presented suggest that the Patriarch’s “rhetoric of peace” alone cannot explain the political significance of the visit.

Jerusalem as a Potential Second Centre of Influence

To understand the significance of the relationship between Theophilos III and Moscow, we must return to the meeting held in Amman in February 2020.

At the initiative of the Patriarch of Jerusalem, representatives of several Local Orthodox Churches gathered there: the Churches of Jerusalem, Russia, Serbia, Romania and Poland, as well as the Church of the Czech Lands and Slovakia.

The Patriarchate of Constantinople did not participate. Representatives of several other Churches were also absent, including those of Alexandria, Antioch, Cyprus, Greece and Bulgaria.

Theophilos III himself emphasised that the meeting was not a council but an informal fraternal gathering intended to facilitate dialogue.

Its substance, however, was highly revealing. Patriarch Kirill openly raised questions concerning primacy in the Orthodox Church, Constantinople’s right to hear appeals from other Churches and its authority to grant autocephaly.

He described the “crisis in Orthodoxy” as a “threat of schism” and criticised the Ecumenical Patriarchate’s actions concerning Ukraine.

The Amman meeting was therefore perceived as an alternative forum for discussing the most contentious disputes between Orthodox Churches, one in which Moscow was strongly represented while Constantinople was absent.

Patriarch Theophilos called for another meeting in 2021 in the interests of “Orthodox unity”, and a similar gathering took place in 2023.

This provides an important starting point for a broader examination of whether such initiatives are establishing a form of parallel ecclesiastical consultation outside the customary framework in which Constantinople holds the primatial role.

This was not the first time Patriarch Theophilos had bypassed Constantinople.

On 13 September 2025, he was received in Istanbul by Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan while Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew was visiting the United States.

Theophilos did not visit the Phanar or meet Bartholomew, although official visits to Istanbul by Orthodox primates normally involve contact with the Ecumenical Patriarchate.

As we previously noted in an article published by Christianity.bg, this move raises the question of whether the Patriarch of Jerusalem is attempting to establish an independent role in relations with the Turkish state, bypassing Constantinople’s intermediary and representative position.

In a commentary entitled “Was Patriarch Theophilos’ Visit to Istanbul During the Ecumenical Patriarch’s Absence Deliberate?”, Orthodox Times editor Efi Efthimiou described the gesture as unprecedented.

She stressed that no other primate of a Local Orthodox Church visiting Istanbul had neglected to pay a visit to the Ecumenical Patriarchate.

According to Efthimiou, the incident must be viewed against the background of Theophilos III’s earlier actions, including his initiative to convene the Amman meeting in 2020 and his steady rapprochement with the Moscow Patriarchate following the granting of autocephaly to the Orthodox Church of Ukraine.

The author also draws attention to Theophilos’ support for the Ukrainian Orthodox Church under Metropolitan Onufriy, while disregarding the Orthodox Church of Ukraine (OCU) and Metropolitan Epifaniy.

The Istanbul visit thus acquired significance beyond diplomatic protocol. It became part of a sequence of gestures that many interpreted as demonstrating Patriarch Theophilos III’s gradual distancing from Constantinople and his orientation towards an alternative centre of influence in the Orthodox world.

“It is also revealing how the Russians refer to the Patriarchate of Jerusalem as the ‘mother of all Christian Churches’, a description that Patriarch Theophilos appears willing to embrace,” Efthimiou observes.

Beyond this, several developments in recent months create an intriguing picture when considered alongside the Moscow meeting.

They give rise to further questions. Is there a connection between this meeting and Russia’s ambitions in Jerusalem? And is Moscow pursuing objectives that extend beyond the Holy City?

The Kremlin’s apparent desire to use the authority of the Patriarchate of Jerusalem to establish a broader sphere of ecclesiastical influence among the Eastern Local Orthodox Churches, and to set this arrangement against Constantinople’s primatial role, is becoming increasingly evident.

This is not necessarily a confrontation between Greek and non-Greek Churches. Patriarch Theophilos III is himself Greek, and the Patriarchate of Jerusalem belongs to the Greek-speaking Eastern tradition.

Rather, it appears to be an attempt to draw the ancient Eastern Patriarchates and other Local Churches into an alternative sphere of influence in which Moscow could play a leading role.

Russia’s Presence in the Holy Land: More Than a Religious Question

Russia’s presence in Jerusalem has a long history. It encompasses ecclesiastical missions, pilgrimage centres, charitable and educational organisations, property holdings and diplomatic contacts. Its historical significance is undeniable.

Yet in today’s complex circumstances, growing numbers of researchers and journalists are asking how these institutions operate and how closely they are connected to Russian state interests.

Particularly revealing is a study published on 30 July 2026 by the Institute for National Security Studies (INSS), entitled “The Russian Orthodox Church as an Institutional Instrument of Putin’s Regime in Israel”.

The authors examine Russian ecclesiastical institutions not merely as religious establishments serving pilgrims but also as participants in Moscow’s efforts to expand its influence in Israel and the Middle East.

The study analyses the activities of the Imperial Orthodox Palestine Society (IOPS), Russian property holdings and the role of the Society’s chairman, Sergei Stepashin, a former Russian prime minister and former director of the Federal Security Service (FSB).

The renewed attention researchers are paying to this issue demonstrates that concerns about the intertwining of ecclesiastical and state influence in Israel cannot simply be dismissed as journalistic speculation. It is entirely possible that the Moscow meeting pursued objectives of a very different nature.

The Strategic Interest in Church Property Abroad

Historically, the Russian Orthodox Church’s property holdings abroad have always had significance extending far beyond the immediate religious needs of believers.

These properties served as places of pilgrimage, spiritual ministry, education, charitable activity and the preservation of Russian culture and language. At the same time, they ensured a lasting Russian presence in countries and regions of strategic importance to Moscow.

As early as the nineteenth century, the Russian imperial authorities supported the establishment of church missions, schools, hospitals and representative institutions in the Holy Land. Religious activity developed alongside the empire’s diplomatic interests.

The Institute for National Security Studies (INSS) traces how this practice continued during the Soviet period, when ecclesiastical missions became one of the instruments used to maintain a Soviet presence in the region.

Today, questions of ownership and management of these properties are once again acquiring political significance. Disputes surrounding them raise important questions about who exercises influence through these institutions and how, what relationships they establish with local authorities and Churches, and to what extent a religious presence can be used to advance state objectives.

Particularly notable is the dispute over the Alexander Compound in Jerusalem’s Old City, immediately adjacent to the Church of the Holy Sepulchre complex.

In 2022, the Jerusalem District Court overturned a decision that would have enabled the Russian state to gain control of the compound. The court ruled that a decision on such a sensitive religious and political matter fell within the authority of the Israeli government.

In February of this year, journalist Guy Assif warned in an investigation entitled “The Compound for Sale”, published in Yedioth Ahronoth:

“Beyond the explosive diplomatic issue that places Israel between Russia and the West, there are concerns that, if Russia acquires this property, it could be used for intelligence purposes.

‘The Russian Compound in Jerusalem, for example, has always been regarded as a centre of Russian intelligence activity, dating back to the Soviet era, and this does not appear to have changed,’ says a senior official familiar with the details. ‘There are suspicions that intelligence operatives continue to operate there today.'”

Several months later, the INSS study examined the potential transfer of the compound to Russian control as a national security issue.

The authors warn that such a development could provide Russia with an additional foothold in the very heart of Jerusalem:

“Given the past and present activities of the Russian Orthodox Church, it is clear that transferring the compound is not merely a religious or even a legal matter, but a fundamental issue with significant diplomatic consequences: granting Russia, and potentially its intelligence services, another foothold in the very heart of Jerusalem.

Moreover, transferring the Alexander Compound to the management of the IOPS will not bring an end to Russian property claims. On the contrary, it is likely only to increase Russia’s appetite for further demands.

As early as 2022, Stepashin identified the next three properties Russia intended to claim from Israel: the Viri Galilei (‘Men of Galilee’) site, the Church of the Ascension (‘the Candle’) and the Convent of St Mary Magdalene in Jerusalem.”

Such expert assessments of the potential consequences serve as a warning that the compound could function as an intelligence centre, and that the dispute concerns not only religious property but also the Russian state’s presence in one of the world’s most sensitive, religiously diverse cities.

This is especially significant during armed conflicts and a full-scale war.

Also noteworthy is the investigation by the open-source intelligence agency Molfar and its findings concerning the activities of Russian Churches in Europe.

The Financial Dimension of the Rapprochement with Moscow

The growing closeness between Moscow and Jerusalem may be driven not only by ambitions to reshape relations between Orthodox Churches but also by very concrete material interests.

Russian support for the Patriarchate of Jerusalem extends beyond diplomacy. It includes funding for restoration work and other ecclesiastical projects.

One illustrative example involves Russia’s Foundation for the Support of Christian Culture and Heritage.

On 3 February 2026, its executive director, Egor Skopenko, was received by Patriarch Theophilos III.

According to the Foundation’s official statement, the organisation has supported the restoration of the monastic complex and the Church of the Annunciation above the Spring of the Most Holy Theotokos in Nazareth since 2023.

This provides a concrete example of the material dimension of relations between the two Churches.

The financial difficulties of the Patriarchate of Jerusalem are also no secret.

In an official statement in 2023, the Patriarchate acknowledged that it had previously entered into partnership agreements to develop land it owned in Jerusalem’s Abu Tor neighbourhood precisely because of financial difficulties.

The Patriarchate subsequently succeeded in recovering all its property rights by paying approximately 80 million shekels.

This case demonstrates the importance of property management, investment and securing funding for its activities.

The issue of Russian financing is addressed even more directly in an investigation by Lera Furman published in Novaya Gazeta Europe on 14 June 2026, entitled “Schröder in a Cassock”.

The author argues that Russian foundations and organisations have provided assistance to the Patriarchate of Jerusalem for many years and that this support has resulted in substantial financial dependence on Moscow.

She also raises the question of whether Theophilos III’s announced peace mission might be connected to an attempt to secure additional funding.

This is a hypothesis advanced by a journalistic investigation, not an established motive on the Patriarch’s part. Nevertheless, it deserves particular attention in light of the documented financial ties between the two sides.

At least two possible dimensions of the rapprochement between Moscow and Jerusalem can therefore be identified.

The first is Moscow’s desire to strengthen its position in the Orthodox world by drawing on the authority of the See of Jerusalem.

The second is the Patriarchate’s own need for financial resources and international support.

These circumstances are not mutually exclusive.

The question remains, however, to what extent such mutual dependence influences Patriarch Theophilos’ public position and his willingness to support initiatives aligned with the Kremlin’s interests.

The influence of the Patriarchate of Jerusalem, however, is not confined to its relations with Moscow.

In recent years, it has intensified its contacts with other Local Orthodox Churches, particularly in the Balkans, as well as with Jordan.

Jordan, Bulgaria and Serbia: New Ties with the Holy Land

Relations between the Patriarchate of Jerusalem and the Orthodox Churches of the Balkans are also developing through initiatives connected with the site of Christ’s Baptism at Al-Maghtas, on the eastern bank of the River Jordan.

In recent years, Jordan has shown an interest in strengthening ties with various Local Orthodox Churches and encouraging their pilgrimage presence in the area.

In 2026, a similar intention was expressed concerning the Bulgarian Orthodox Church.

As we reported on Christianity.bg, Prince Ghazi bin Muhammad, adviser to King Abdullah II on religious and cultural affairs, expressed an intention to provide a plot of land near the site of Christ’s Baptism for the construction of a Bulgarian pilgrimage centre.

This initiative also has an earlier history.

According to information available to us, during the tenure of the late Patriarch Maxim, the Bulgarian Orthodox Church had already raised the possibility of acquiring its own property in the area to build an ecclesiastical centre.

At the time, however, the proposal was categorically rejected.

Today, the situation appears different. An intention to provide a plot of land has already been announced, and in September 2026 Patriarch Daniil made an official visit to Jerusalem and Jordan at the invitation of Patriarch Theophilos III.

Between 25 and 30 September, he concelebrated the Divine Liturgy with the Patriarch of Jerusalem at the Church of the Holy Sepulchre, visited Al-Maghtas and was received by King Abdullah II in Amman on 29 September.

The question of a Bulgarian ecclesiastical presence near the site of Christ’s Baptism has thus once again received attention at the highest level.

A similar intention was expressed regarding the Serbian Orthodox Church in December 2025.

During Patriarch Porfirije’s visit to Jordan, Prince Ghazi conveyed King Abdullah II’s wish to provide the Serbian Church with a plot of land in the Al-Maghtas area.

These initiatives demonstrate Jordan’s desire to strengthen relations with various Local Orthodox Churches and facilitate their pilgrimage presence at the site associated with Christ’s Baptism.

Of particular significance in this context is the International Orthodox University at Al-Maghtas, which opened in May 2026.

This is not merely a local educational initiative but a project aspiring to become an international academic and theological centre associated with one of Christianity’s holiest sites.

The university was inaugurated by King Abdullah II, while the Patriarchate of Jerusalem described it as one of its important ecclesiastical institutions and a venue for meetings and dialogue among Churches, peoples and cultures.

Al-Maghtas is therefore likely to establish itself gradually not only as a pilgrimage destination but also as a centre for theological education, academic exchange and international engagement.

A parallel can usefully be drawn here with Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew’s efforts to reopen the Halki Theological School, which was closed by the Turkish authorities in 1971.

For him, restoring this institution is particularly important for the Patriarchate of Constantinople and the training of Orthodox clergy.

Bartholomew sought the support of US President Donald Trump, who raised the issue with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan.

In 2026, discussions continued between the Ecumenical Patriarchate and the Turkish authorities, while representatives of the US administration also participated in talks concerning the school’s reopening.

Thus, while the Ecumenical Patriarchate is seeking to restore its historic theological school and preserve its ability to train clergy independently, the Patriarchate of Jerusalem already has a new international academic institution at Al-Maghtas, supported by the Jordanian state.

This does not necessarily indicate a confrontation between the two patriarchal centres, but it does show that the question of future centres of theological education and international presence is becoming increasingly important for the Eastern Church.

All these developments point to Moscow’s ambition to expand its influence in the Balkans as well, including through ecclesiastical contacts and institutional partnerships with Local Churches whose positions align with Russian geopolitical interests.

The Patriarchate of Jerusalem is also assuming an increasingly prominent position within this network of interchurch relations.

Against the backdrop of Theophilos III’s meeting with Vladimir Putin and Patriarch Kirill in Moscow, this deserves particular attention.

The Patriarchate of Jerusalem is strengthening its institutional capabilities and expanding its international contacts at a time when relations among Local Orthodox Churches are heavily influenced by Russia’s full-scale war against Ukraine.

Jerusalem’s Antiquity and the Canonical Order

In some ecclesiastical circles sympathetic to the Russian position, it is frequently emphasised that the Patriarchate of Jerusalem is older than the See of Constantinople.

Historically, this is true. Jerusalem’s Christian community traces its origins to apostolic times.

However, a distinction must be made between apostolic antiquity and canonical primacy.

Constantinople acquired a special place in the ecclesiastical order after becoming the imperial capital.

Canon 3 of the Second Ecumenical Council in 381 established that the Bishop of Constantinople held primacy of honour after Rome because the city was New Rome.

Canon 28 of the Council of Chalcedon in 451 further developed this principle.

Canon 36 of the Council in Trullo of 691–692 explicitly reaffirmed the order: Rome, Constantinople, Alexandria, Antioch and Jerusalem.

The Fathers granted prerogatives to the See of Old Rome because it was the imperial city and, following their earlier decision, the bishops granted equal prerogatives to the Bishop of New Rome.

Jerusalem possesses exceptional apostolic antiquity and spiritual authority, but this does not invalidate Constantinople’s traditional canonical position.

Confusing these two concepts is frequently used today in arguments against the Ecumenical Patriarchate, but it does not in itself alter the canonical order of the Church of Christ.

Another Initiative by Patriarch Bartholomew: A Fraternal Synaxis in Constantinople

On 4 September 2026, in connection with the congress of the Society for the Law of the Eastern Churches in Budapest, Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew announced that he had invited the primates of the Churches of Alexandria, Antioch and Jerusalem to participate in a fraternal Synaxis at the Phanar on 30 November, the feast day of the Holy Apostle Andrew, patron saint of the Church of Constantinople.

Bartholomew presented this initiative as a gathering of the four ancient apostolic sees of the East, which share a common historical and theological responsibility for the witness of Orthodox Christianity.

The invitation is significant not only because the proposed date falls shortly after the Moscow meeting with Theophilos III, but also because it demonstrates a different approach to ecclesiastical dialogue.

Rather than establishing parallel forums that might be perceived as challenging Constantinople’s role, Bartholomew is proposing a gathering specifically of the ancient Patriarchates, united in liturgical communion in the historic capital.

The forthcoming Synaxis of the primates of the ancient Churches on 30 November will serve as a test of relations between Constantinople and the three ancient Eastern Patriarchates of Alexandria, Antioch and Jerusalem.

Their positions on the Ukrainian church question already differ substantially.

Patriarch Theodore II of Alexandria recognised the autocephaly of the Orthodox Church of Ukraine in 2019, whereas the Patriarchates of Antioch and Jerusalem did not follow suit.

Meanwhile, Patriarchs John X and Theophilos III maintain active contacts with the Moscow Patriarchate.

Just a few days before Theophilos III’s visit to Moscow, on 30 October, Patriarch John X of Antioch received a delegation from the Moscow Patriarchate headed by Metropolitan Anthony of Volokolamsk.

On 5 November, the Patriarch of Jerusalem met Russian Patriarch Kirill and President Vladimir Putin in Moscow.

These developments lend additional significance to Patriarch Bartholomew’s invitation.

Accepting it would signal a willingness to engage in fraternal dialogue despite existing disagreements.

A refusal or an unexplained absence would inevitably raise further questions.

The festive liturgy at the Phanar on 30 November should therefore be regarded as an important test of the Orthodox Churches’ ability to engage in dialogue without allowing geopolitical interests to determine their disagreements.

Amid the prevailing political tensions, the meeting also has clear implications for the balance of ecclesiastical authority.

Jerusalem finds itself in a delicate position, caught between its demonstrably close relationship with Moscow on the one hand and Constantinople’s invitation on the other.

The Temptation of a “Second Centre” of Influence

The question of Theophilos III himself is also important.

It seems unlikely that the Patriarch of Jerusalem seriously intends to become the head of an alternative centre of Orthodox influence. Nor is it known whether Moscow has offered him such a role.

At this stage, we can only speculate on the basis of known facts and events, since we do not know what was discussed behind closed doors at the Kremlin.

Nevertheless, the possibility deserves consideration because the Patriarchate of Jerusalem possesses something no other Church can acquire: the spiritual authority of the city associated with Christ’s Crucifixion and Resurrection.

That authority could translate into even greater influence if reinforced by international contacts, educational institutions, diplomatic relations and cooperation with other Local Orthodox Churches.

The Kremlin meeting, the property disputes in Jerusalem, the Amman initiative and the forthcoming Synaxis at the Phanar all warrant close attention.

On one side stands Moscow, expanding its political presence in the Holy Land and seeking ecclesiastical partners in disputes over primacy in the Orthodox world.

On the other stands Constantinople, striving to preserve its leading role and unite the ancient Patriarchates around their shared historical heritage and responsibility for Orthodox unity.

Between them stands Jerusalem, which Moscow evidently regards as a potential participant in the restructuring of interchurch relations.

Such a development would be highly advantageous to the Kremlin.

Rather than challenging Constantinople’s role on its own, Moscow could support another ancient see whose historical claims could be invoked in disputes over primacy in the Orthodox world.

This also matters in the context of the war against Ukraine.

Putin shows no willingness to end the war without achieving his maximum political and territorial objectives.

Russia is seeking a way out of the war that would allow it to present the outcome to the world as its own victory.

In doing so, the Kremlin is also counting on the Russian Church’s support for the war.

Could Theophilos III see the present political moment as an opportunity to strengthen Jerusalem’s role and influence?

This remains a hypothesis.

Nevertheless, the Amman meetings, his closeness to Moscow, his demonstrated distancing from Constantinople, expanding contacts with Orthodox Churches in the Balkans, public gestures towards Putin and the presentation of the Order of Friendship all raise legitimate questions about the direction the Patriarchate of Jerusalem is taking and where its rapprochement with Moscow might lead.

Perhaps this is precisely why Theophilos III avoids directly mentioning Russia’s war against Ukraine in his public statements.

Where Does Ukraine Stand in This “Struggle for Peace”?

While church primates speak of peace and mediation, Ukraine continues to pay the price of war in human lives, devastated cities and destroyed infrastructure.

In portraying Putin as a defender of the Orthodox faith, Theophilos III also expressed prayerful support for the Russian president.

But does the Patriarch of Jerusalem realise that, through such words, the spiritual authority of the Patriarchate of Jerusalem could be used to legitimise a political image that stands in stark contrast to the destruction and human suffering in Ukraine?

There is no need to speculate about what was discussed behind closed doors to recognise the problem with the public message.

The Patriarch speaks of peace while simultaneously supporting a political leader who continues his aggression against the civilian population, seeking to impose his terms and portray any eventual end to the war as his own victory.

According to two participants in informal contacts aimed at negotiating a peace settlement, Vladimir Putin is unwilling to abandon military pressure.

On the contrary, Moscow continues to demand territorial concessions, including the surrender of the part of Donbas that remains under Ukrainian control.

Meanwhile, winter attacks on energy and transport infrastructure are being viewed as a means of forcing Kyiv to make concessions.

One source cited by the Financial Times conveys Putin’s position through the words of a participant in the informal contacts:

“I will destroy all your infrastructure until you agree. By next year, Ukraine will have no infrastructure left. All bridges, ports, railways, energy infrastructure, power stations… will be destroyed.”

If this information is accurate, and the publication is a reputable one, the message is deeply alarming.

This is not an attempt to find compromise and peace, but an effort to break the will of Ukraine’s civilian population by destroying essential infrastructure, allowing Putin to present himself as a victor before Russian society and the wider world as quickly as possible.

The scale of the war is also evident in estimates of Russian casualties.

According to calculations by The Economist (the data repository is cited in the original publication), by the end of October 2026 the total number of Russian military personnel killed or wounded stood between 1.4 million and 2.1 million.

The number killed was estimated at between 374,000 and 770,000.

This is a statistical range whose lower bound alone demonstrates the enormous human cost of the war.

To this must be added devastated Ukrainian cities, murdered civilians, abducted children, millions forced to flee their homes and the destruction of normal life in a European country.

The economic cost is also rising.

During the first nine months of 2026, Russia’s federal budget deficit exceeded 5.18 trillion roubles, surpassing the deficit originally planned for the entire year.

In effect, the military strategy is consuming ever more resources, while its costs are being passed on to Russian society as a whole.

In an interview with UkraineWorld on 5 November, American journalist Fareed Zakaria considers the war from an even broader perspective, not only in terms of Ukraine’s fate but also as a test of the international order established after the Second World War.

Russia has violated the principles of international law under which a state cannot change borders through armed aggression, regardless of its military strength or nuclear arsenal.

If such aggression is rewarded, the consequences will not be confined to Eastern Europe.

They will affect confidence in international law, the security of states neighbouring Russia and the willingness of other powers to use military coercion to achieve territorial and political objectives.

This brings us back to the central question raised by this article.

What does it mean to speak of peace when the country under attack continues to be bombarded?

Who has the right to represent its interests?

And can a church initiative genuinely be described as peacemaking if it does not place the sovereignty, security and voice of the Ukrainian people at its centre?

The Patriarch of Jerusalem may have a role to play in reconciliation efforts.

Yet the moral authority of church primates is not measured by their proximity to presidents, the state honours they receive or their participation in diplomatic meetings.

It is established above all through their ability to speak the truth, defend victims and refuse to turn human suffering into a bargaining chip in political negotiations.

Any possible rapprochement between Moscow and Jerusalem, like any proposal for a new centre of Orthodox influence, must therefore be judged not by ceremonial gestures and declarations of unity, but by its concrete attitude towards the war and its victims.

Orthodox unity cannot be achieved by remaining silent about aggression, disregarding Gospel principles and human rights, or bypassing the Ukrainian Church and Ukrainian society.

Nor can such unity be built by substituting the terms dictated by the stronger party for a just peace.

The Church cannot bless a peace imposed through coercion in favour of the aggressor, nor can it praise a political leader against whom the International Criminal Court in The Hague has issued an arrest warrant.

Whatever decoration Patriarch Theophilos III may have received from Vladimir Putin, that gesture cannot erase the fact that on 17 March 2023 the International Criminal Court in The Hague issued an arrest warrant for the Russian president in connection with his alleged responsibility for the unlawful deportation (abduction) of Ukrainian children.

This is such a grave matter that any public praise of Putin loses its significance by comparison.

What matters most is not simply who will wield the greatest influence in the Orthodox world, Moscow, Constantinople or Jerusalem, but whether the Church can preserve its independence and place truth, justice and human suffering above political calculations.

For when those in power seek influence and ordinary people seek deliverance from war, the Church must make clear whose side it stands on in fulfilling its ministry.

Patriarch Theophilos III’s visit to Moscow should not be viewed as an isolated ecclesiastical or diplomatic gesture. Rather, it forms part of the Kremlin’s efforts to build a network of influence through the Russian Orthodox Church and organisations associated with it.

The study “The Russian Orthodox Church as an Institutional Instrument of Putin’s Regime in Israel” traces how Russia’s ecclesiastical presence in Jerusalem and the Holy Land intersects with Moscow’s political and strategic interests, including the activities of organisations linked to the Russian state and its security services.

Molfar’s investigation, “Does the Russian Orthodox Church Spy in Europe?”, demonstrates why Russian churches and property holdings in Europe have raised concerns about their potential use for purposes beyond religion.

The case of Moldova is particularly revealing.

Investigations by Reuters and RISE Moldova expose how Russia establishes channels of political influence through the financing of church projects, pilgrimage trips, material incentives and the recruitment of clergy.

They also show how the ecclesiastical environment and the trust placed in clergy can be exploited for purposes entirely unrelated to spiritual ministry.

A picture emerges of influence being cultivated at multiple levels, from patriarchs and metropolitans to parish priests and ordinary laypeople.

On the surface, everything may resemble ordinary Orthodox religious and educational activity: pilgrimages, church celebrations, charitable work, spiritual fellowship and fraternal relations.

Yet journalistic investigations and expert research suggest that some of these initiatives may conceal very different objectives: establishing political networks, consolidating Russia’s presence and extending Moscow’s influence across different parts of the world.

Against this backdrop, Patriarch Theophilos III risks becoming a pawn in a much larger geopolitical game orchestrated by the Kremlin.

At the same time, his peace mission, reported by TASS several days after the Moscow meeting and involving a forthcoming visit to Ukraine, becomes a paradox: a peacemaker in the service of the warmongering Putin.

The author’s views may not reflect those of the editorial team.