Missionary Work Sees African Catholics Outnumber Europeans — Why Is Moscow Recruiting Africans Already Orthodox?
by MiceálO’Hurley*
CAIRO — The Holy See has just confirmed a historic demographic shift: Africa now has more Catholics than Europe. Just prior to Vatican II, Europe had more than 10-times as many Catholics as did Africa. Today, the number of African Catholics eclipse those in Europe.
Africa’s Catholic population grew from approximately 22.9 million in 1960 to 288.3 million in 2024, surpassing Europe’s 287.2 million. The figures, published in 2026 in the Vatican’s statistical yearbook, reflect decades of missionary activity, demographic growth, and the development of increasingly indigenous African Churches.
Rome’s success offers a striking contrast to Moscow’s approach to Orthodox Christianity in Africa.
In December 2021, the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) established its African Exarchate. It presented the initiative to the world as a missionary undertaking. According to the Exarchate’s own figures, its presence has expanded from 5-parishes and communities in 2021 to 374 by October 2026. This includes the claim of 268 clergy serving across the continent. Such statistics represent extraordinary institutional growth. It omits, however, equivalent growth in the number of Africans newly converted to Orthodoxy. The number of faithful remains unclear, and the Exarchate’s figures have not been independently audited.
The distinction matters. Unlike the Catholic Church’s long-term development of dioceses, seminaries, schools, hospitals, charitable institutions and locally led communities, Moscow’s expansion relied on creating competing ecclesiastical structures within territory historically already served by the ancient Patriarchate of Alexandria and All Africa.
African bishops, priests, religious and laypeople increasingly shape the Catholic Church’s future. The central question is whether Moscow’s expansion is producing a similarly rooted African Orthodox Church—or principally extending the jurisdiction of the foreign Moscow Patriarchate in Africa.
The evidence suggests that a substantial part of the ROC’s growth has come not from bringing non-Christians to Orthodoxy, but from attracting clergy and congregations already Orthodox and historically attached to Alexandria. In that respect, its expansion appears to be a zero-sum exercise for Orthodoxy. Increasing Moscow’s institutional reach by transfers without asymmetrical growth in the number of people brought to the Christian faith by baptism risks redefining the Orthodox understanding and ethos of mission.
This raises a fundamental question about the meaning of missionary work. Is success now to be measured by the number of people introduced to Christ, communities established and the local clergy and leadership nurtured—or by the number of existing Orthodox parishes and priests persuaded to change ecclesiastical allegiance?
Mission or jurisdictional expansion?
The timing of Moscow’s initiative cannot be separated from the dispute over Ukraine. After Patriarch Theodoros II of Alexandria recognised the autocephaly of the Orthodox Church of Ukraine in 2019, Moscow broke Eucharistic communion with the Alexandrian hierarchy. As a direct challenge to the jurisdiction of one of the oldest Churches in Christianity, the ROC established its African Exarchate within the jurisdiction of Alexandria while ignoring its presence and Pentarchic seniority, rights, and privileges.
The Patriarchate of Alexandria regarded the move as retaliation for its recognition of the Ukrainian Church. In January 2022, its Holy Synod described the Russian intervention as an incursion into its canonical territory and accused Moscow of seeking to acquire its indigenous clergy. In November 2022, Alexandria deposed Metropolitan Leonid, the first Russian Exarch in Africa, citing a series of canonical offences, including the acquisition of local clergy through payments, the establishment of rival ecclesiastical structures and the promotion of ethnic factionalism. Moscow rejected Alexandria’s authority to discipline its clergy and declared the decision canonically invalid.
Every appearance is that the Russian Exarchate in Africa was not erected for the benefit of Africa or Africans but for Russia and Russians, all at the expense of Alexandria and existing Orthodox people and communities.
The controversy goes to the heart of Orthodox ecclesiology. The traditional principle of μία πόλις, εἷς ἐπίσκοπος—one city, one bishop—expresses the expectation of a single canonical episcopal authority within a given territory. It does not prohibit multiple parishes or pastoral arrangements for different communities. It does, however, raise fundamental questions when a foreign patriarchate establishes competing episcopal structures in territory already served by another canonical Church.
Saint Cyprian of Carthage expressed the underlying principle and tradition of episcopal unity:
“Episcopatusunusest, cuius a singulis in solidum pars tenetur.” (“The episcopate is one, each bishop holding his part in its entirety”.)
Moscow has repeatedly condemned what it regards as encroachment upon its own canonical territory claims in Ukraine all while establishing parallel structures within the African territory of Alexandria. The abundant irony and hypocrisy are impossible to overlook.
An absent missionary imperative
Institutional expansion has never been a stated purpose of the Orthodox mission tradition. Its apostolic vocation is to proclaim the Gospel, bring people into the life of the Church through baptism, catechesis, and the Eucharist, and establish sustainable Christian communities. It also entails translating Scripture and liturgical texts, developing indigenous clergy and leadership, serving local populations, and allowing the faith to take root in their languages and cultures.
Orthodox Christianity is not synonymous with Greekness, Russianness or any other national identity. The objective of mission is not to reproduce the missionary’s homeland abroad, but to establish a living Church among the people being evangelised.
Archbishop Anastasios of Albania, one of the most influential modern Orthodox missionary theologians, famously observed:
“Church without mission is a contradiction in terms.”
Yet the nature and purpose of mission are precisely what Moscow’s African initiative brings into question. Where existing Orthodox congregations are transferred between jurisdictions, the numerical expansion of one patriarchate cannot legitimately be counted as the evangelisation of a new population.
The contrast with Catholic development is instructive. Catholic expansion in Africa has involved the gradual development of local dioceses, seminaries, schools, healthcare institutions, and indigenous leadership. This is not to suggest that Catholic missionary history has been without cultural or institutional shortcomings. Rather, it illustrates the importance of building enduring local communities rather than measuring success principally through territorial or institutional reach.
ROC Expansion and Russian State Interests
Africa covers approximately 30.4 million square kilometres. The continent has enormous areas where Orthodox pastoral provision is limited or absent. Although no reliable continent-wide geospatial study establishes precisely how many Africans live more than 50 kilometres from an Orthodox parish, the shortage of Orthodox pastoral provision is abundantly evident.
That makes the location of Moscow’s expansion particularly relevant. In countries such as Kenya and Tanzania, where Alexandria already has established Orthodox communities, the Russian Exarchate has concentrated considerable effort on attracting existing clergy and congregations to their banner. This is not the same as establishing a missionary presence among populations previously unserved by Orthodoxy or remain so today.
Research by the European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR), the Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI) and the Centre for a New American Security has examined the overlap between Russian political interests and ROC expansion in Africa. ECFR identified three broad areas of activity: countries where Russian security interests are concentrated, including the Central African Republic (CAR), Uganda, and Mali; countries with established Russian diaspora communities; and countries with substantial existing Orthodox populations, particularly Kenya and Tanzania.
In the CAR, Russia has developed an extensive political and security relationship with the government, initially through the Wagner network and subsequently through associated Russian structures. The Russian Orthodox presence in Bangui was developed within that wider context. Uganda has also become an important centre for Moscow’s ecclesiastical ambitions, including plans for substantial theological, educational, and cultural infrastructure.
ECFR has further documented relationships between the Russian Church’s African expansion and state-backed corporations, including Russian Railways, Rosatom and Rusal. These connections do not, by themselves, prove that the Kremlin directs every Russian Orthodox mission. The distorted symphonia, however, makes it impossible to assess the Exarchate independently of Russia’s wider political and strategic presence driven by the Russkiy Mir (Russian World) ideology.
The role of money
One of the most serious allegations concerns the use of financial inducements to attract Alexandrian clergy and laity.
In January 2024, Patriarch Theodoros II alleged that Russian representatives had paid Alexandrian clergy $200 USD each to sign documents leaving his patriarchate and join Moscow. He stated:
“They bribed our clergy with two hundred dollars so that they would sign the documents, leave our patriarchate, and join the Moscow Patriarchate.”
Bishop Chrysostomos of Bukoba and Western Tanzania subsequently made a similarly forceful accusation, declaring:
“They only hand out roubles. They buy consciences.”
These are allegations by Alexandrian hierarchs, not independently established findings. The Russian Exarchate rejects accusations that it buys clergy, maintaining that priests have joined voluntarily and for legitimate ecclesiastical and pastoral reasons. Nevertheless, the allegations cannot simply be dismissed, particularly given Alexandria’s formal accusation of the acquisition of local clergy through payments in its November 2022 synodal decision. Local corroboration of the payments is notorious.
The issue is not whether financial assistance to poor communities is inherently improper. Education, scholarships, healthcare, and charitable support are legitimate expressions of Christian service. The concern arises when material benefits are alleged to be conditional upon changing ecclesiastical allegiance. At that point, charitable assistance risks becoming an instrument of recruitment rather than an expression of Christian diakonia.
There is a historical warning here. In Theory and Society, Marian Burchardt and Ann Swidler discuss Birgit Meyer’s research into nineteenth-century German Protestant missions among the Ewe people of the Gold Coast. They observe that:
“Western education, new clothes and money clearly implied each other.”
The historical lesson is that material benefits offered by “mission work” becomes inextricably entangled with religious affiliation. The resulting appearance of conversion without necessarily producing enduring spiritual commitment and lapse of practice have been the historical pattern. The comparison does not prove that Moscow’s activities are identical, but it illustrates why missionary work must be judged by the depth and durability of Christian formation, not simply by the numbers reported. The ROC’s own reported statistics reinforce this concern as re-affiliation activity and numbers far outstrips conversion and baptism on a continent grossly under-served by Orthodoxy.
African and international concerns
Criticism of the Russian Exarchate is not confined to the Greek Orthodox hierarchy.
In an October 2024 analysis for the Foreign Policy Research Institute, Bob Wekesa, director of the African Centre for the Study of the United States at the University of the Witwatersrand, offered a striking assessment:
“I deduce that the Russian Orthodox (Church) will aim to capture a small elite tied to the top echelons of governments in pursuit of opaque Russian interests rather than winning large congregations.”
Professor Regina Elsner of the University of Münster has likewise warned that:
“The Russian Orthodox Church must clearly be viewed as part of Russia’s soft power.”
Belarusian theologian and political scientist Natallia Vasilevich, interviewed by Deutsche Welle in March 2026, was more direct in her assessment of the impact on African Orthodoxy:
“These activities of the Russian Orthodox Church on the continent are deeply destructive to African Orthodoxy.”
She argued that the Exarchate had concentrated its efforts on attracting existing Orthodox clergy and congregations rather than building new communities. Inherent in this criticism is the age-old dynamic of foreign interests exploiting the financial weakness of Africans through material incentives.
These are assessments by analysts and the ROC’s own reports contain data the exposes a consistent concern―the real likelihood that ROC ecclesiastical expansion is serving purposes beyond the proclamation of the Gospel.
A Question of Missionary Purpose
Moscow has offered several justifications for its African presence: requests from African clergy for Russian protection and jurisdiction; pastoral care for neglected Orthodox communities; support for Russian citizens and historic Russian diaspora communities; humanitarian and educational development; and the evangelisation of African populations.
Some of the pastoral needs invoked in these arguments may be entirely genuine. Russian-speaking Orthodox Christians living in Africa may reasonably require worship and pastoral care in their own language. African clergy may likewise have legitimate concerns regarding inadequate resources, cultural insensitivity, or pastoral neglect. The Patriarchate of Alexandria has long been called upon to undertake immense missionary and humanitarian responsibilities with extremely limited resources. Such concerns deserve serious attention rather than dismissal.
However, the legitimacy of a pastoral need must never be confused with the legitimacy of the ecclesiastical means employed to address it. Cooperation has always been available and there is no evidence Alexandria refused to grant permission for ROC operations in Africa.
Alexandria’s permissiveness and support of foreign Churches seeking to meet the needs of their faithful is abundant. Despite the Bulgarian Orthodox Church declining to recognise the Orthodox Church of Ukraine as did Alexandria, instead of choosing the schismatic path of creating churches and assigning clergy without the permission of the Patriarchate of Alexandria, the Buglarians made their request of Patriarch of Alexandrian and All Africa Theodoros II and it was granted. In 2023, His Eminence Metropolitan Damaskinos of Johannesburg and Pretoria of the Patriarchate of Alexandria attended the consecration of the church of St. John of Rila, the first ever Bulgarian Orthodox Church parish in the Republic of South Africa. It remains without question that Alexandria has been sensitive to meeting the needs of other Orthodox communities, even those that disagree over the recognition of Ukrainian Church―the issue that instigated the ROC’s non-canonical activities in Africa.
According to the canonical order of the Orthodox Church, Africa falls within the ecclesiastical jurisdiction of the ancient Patriarchate of Alexandria. Pastoral care for Russian-speaking Orthodox Christians, as well as any missionary initiatives undertaken by another Orthodox Church, must therefore be exercised through cooperation with, and under the canonical authority of, that Patriarchate.
Indeed, Russian-speaking clergy and Russian-language services have existed within the jurisdiction of Alexandria, which has not prevented such pastoral provision. There is consequently no inherent conflict between serving Russian Orthodox Christians in Africa and respecting the canonical rights of the Alexandrian Church. The two objectives are entirely compatible.
The same principle applies to the grievances of African clergy. However legitimate particular complaints may be, they cannot justify the unilateral transfer of clergy and congregations to another Patriarchate or the establishment of competing ecclesiastical jurisdictions. Such difficulties must be addressed through appropriate ecclesiastical dialogue and canonical procedures, not through the creation of parallel structures.
Neither pastoral necessity nor missionary enthusiasm can confer upon the Russian Orthodox Church a jurisdiction it does not canonically possess.
The establishment of the Russian Exarchate in Africa therefore raises a question considerably more fundamental than the effectiveness or sincerity of Moscow’s missionary ambitions. It constitutes an intrusion into the canonical territory of another Orthodox Patriarchate, establishing parallel ecclesiastical structures that undermine ecclesiastical unity and perpetuate schismatic divisions.
This fundamental ecclesiological problem cannot be resolved by invoking charitable activities, educational projects, humanitarian assistance, or the recruitment of clergy and congregations.
Africa already possesses an extensive network of Christian, charitable, and humanitarian organisations addressing food insecurity, inadequate healthcare, housing shortages, limited access to clean water, and educational deprivation. The existence of these organisations does not make additional Orthodox initiatives unnecessary. It does, however, demonstrate the considerable opportunities for cooperation, coordination, and responsible stewardship.
Rather than establishing competing ecclesiastical institutions, the Russian Orthodox Church could contribute substantially to the existing missionary and humanitarian work of the Patriarchate of Alexandria. Such cooperation would strengthen Orthodox witness, reduce unnecessary duplication, and direct scarce resources towards the spiritual and material needs of African communities rather than institutional rivalry.
The refusal to pursue such cooperation inevitably raises questions about the underlying objectives of Moscow’s African initiative, particularly where ecclesiastical expansion appears closely aligned with the geopolitical interests of the Russian state. The acquisition of existing parishes and clergy cannot, in itself, be presented as evidence of successful evangelisation.
The central issue is therefore twofold: whether Moscow’s activities respect the canonical and ecclesiological order of the Orthodox Church, and whether they genuinely fulfil the apostolic purpose of mission — bringing people to Christ, establishing sustainable Christian communities, developing indigenous leadership, and serving humanity.
These two questions cannot be separated. A missionary initiative that undermines the unity of the Church in the name of spreading the Gospel contradicts a fundamental dimension of the Orthodox understanding of mission itself.
The Catholic experience demonstrates the extraordinary potential of long-term missionary development rooted in local communities and focused on the human person. Orthodox history offers its own examples, from Saints Cyril and Methodius among the Slavs to Saint Innocent of Alaska. Their legacy was not merely the extension of ecclesiastical administration, but the establishment of Christian communities capable of expressing and transmitting the faith within their own cultural, linguistic, and social traditions.
The purpose of Orthodox mission has always been the proclamation of the Gospel, the salvation of humanity, and the transformation of human life in Christ — not the acquisition of ecclesiastical territory or the expansion of geopolitical influence.
If Moscow genuinely wishes to contribute to the evangelisation of Africa, the most persuasive demonstration would be its willingness to support the canonical Patriarchate of Alexandria, strengthen existing Orthodox communities, foster indigenous African leadership, and participate in missionary and humanitarian work without competing with or diminishing the Church already entrusted with that mission.
The authenticity of Orthodox mission is measured not by the territory acquired or the ecclesiastical structures established, but by fidelity to the Gospel, the unity of the Church, and the spiritual transformation of the people it serves.
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*MiceálO’Hurley is an Irish and American academic, writer and researcher, a former diplomat and analyst of international security and defence. Specialising in international conflict resolution, mediation, and security issues, Miceál has been recognised as an expert on defence and security issues, appearing regularly on international television networks such as CNN, BBC, and Al Jazeera. He is a Member of Chatham House and a Fellow of the Royal Society of Arts (RSA). He is also Archon Nomophylax of the Ecumenical Patriarchate, an honourary distinction awarded to him by Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew.
This article was originally published on the Fos Fanariou website and republished on LF with the author’s permission.
