Some analysts describe the documents adopted by the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe and the European Parliament concerning the Russian Orthodox Church as Europe’s great awakening to the Church’s influence within European societies.
Last month, the European Parliament adopted a resolution on transnational repression.
It should be noted that the final version of the resolution, which aims to protect political exiles, journalists, human rights defenders, and activists from persecution by authoritarian regimes, with Russia, China, Belarus, and others explicitly identified among the principal offenders, was relatively restrained.
THE LEGISLATIVE BACKSTAGE OF BRUSSELS
I followed both its drafting and adoption. Amendments contained in the first draft of the resolution stated that the Russian Federation had used its intelligence services, the FSB, the successor to the KGB, and the GRU to coordinate with structures linked to the Russian Orthodox Church, particularly the Moscow Patriarchate, in carrying out activities amounting to transnational repression. These included surveillance, recruitment, influence operations, and other hybrid methods directed against dissidents in exile, opposition figures, and diaspora communities abroad.
The proposed amendments also referred to the historical intertwining of the Soviet security services and the hierarchy of the Russian Orthodox Church, including documented cases of clergy cooperation with the KGB. They argued that under President Vladimir Putin this relationship had evolved into a renewed alignment between state authorities and church structures.
Members of the European Parliament were explicitly asked to endorse the assertion that the Russian Orthodox Church serves as an instrument of soft power, ideological influence, and the projection of narratives associated with the concept of the so called “Russian World.”
It is hardly surprising that the strongest of these amendments did not appear in the final version. Nevertheless, the adopted text still states that Russia uses proxies, including the Wagner Group, Chechen death squads, cultural institutions, and, in certain cases, structures affiliated with the Russian Orthodox Church, to carry out transnational repression.
The most direct accusations were removed because this reflects the normal legislative process in any democratic system, where compromise texts are the ones that ultimately secure sufficient support.
Even though the final resolution is less explicit, analytical materials prepared for the European Parliament, particularly the comprehensive study on vulnerabilities to transnational repression produced for the Committee on Foreign Affairs, examine religious organizations associated with authoritarian regimes as channels of proxy influence.
Russian Orthodox churches and parishes abroad are frequently described as structures that can be used to monitor attitudes within émigré communities.
Before the resolution reached the plenary chamber, Members of the European Parliament had reviewed extensive background materials describing cases of “spiritual pressure,” in which clergy serving Russian Orthodox parishes abroad allegedly transmitted Moscow’s official ideology, condemned political exiles, or gathered information about activists under the guise of pastoral ministry.
The proposed amendments also retain value because they remain preserved in the archives and working papers. These formulations entered the analytical vocabulary of European expert institutions and were presented to legislators as part of the accompanying documentation.
We chose to highlight this document, one of the last adopted before the parliamentary recess, as an important milestone in the legislative process.
THE TENTH “ANNIVERSARY” RESOLUTION. WHAT ABOUT THE OTHERS?
This is the tenth document adopted in recent years in which European institutions conclude that the Russian Orthodox Church serves as a direct and overt instrument of the Russian regime.
It is worth recalling the other resolutions of the European Parliament and the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe concerning the role of the Russian Orthodox Church.
Following Aleksey Navalny’s death in 2024, PACE adopted a resolution explicitly stating that the hierarchy of the Moscow Patriarchate, including Patriarch Kirill, promotes the ideology of the Russian World. It called for Patriarch Kirill and the Russian Orthodox hierarchy to be regarded as an ideological extension of Putin’s regime. The same resolution also states that the Russian Orthodox Church is used as an instrument of Russian influence and propaganda.
In June of the same year, PACE again called for recognition of the Russian Orthodox Church’s role as an instrument of Russian state propaganda and referred back to its earlier resolution. In effect, it reinforced the international assessment that the leadership of the Russian Orthodox Church acts as an accomplice to the Russian state’s propaganda.
In October, another resolution, entitled Legal and Human Rights Aspects of the Russian Federation’s Aggression Against Ukraine, was adopted. Although this was not a resolution devoted specifically to the Russian Orthodox Church, it formed part of the broader condemnation of Russian aggression. It nevertheless formally reaffirmed this assessment, presenting the Russian Orthodox Church as a prominent example of how religious institutions can be transformed into instruments of hybrid warfare.
It was during this period, from late 2024 to early 2025, that European institutions increasingly began assessing religious organizations not only through the lens of freedom of religion but also through the perspective of national security.
A European Parliament resolution adopted in January 2025 on Russian disinformation and historical falsification explicitly condemns Moscow’s use of Orthodoxy for geopolitical purposes, including through the instrumentalization of the Russian Orthodox Church.
An April 2025 European Parliament resolution on targeted attacks against Christians in the Democratic Republic of the Congo refers to the growing influence of the Russian Orthodox Church in Africa as part of broader Russian influence.
A July 2025 European Parliament resolution on Ukraine states directly that Russia uses the Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate as an instrument of pressure and control, including against religious communities in Ukraine.
If these documents are considered alongside an earlier document from 2002 criticizing the Russian Orthodox Church and two sanctions related documents calling for sanctions against Patriarch Kirill Gundyayev in 2022 and 2026, with the latter still under discussion and the Council of the European Union expected to hold its final vote before 15 July 2026, they together form the first, rather sobering, anniversary package of European normative documents calling both for limiting the influence of the Russian Orthodox Church and for imposing financial restrictions on its leader, Kirill Gundyayev.
EUROPE’S AWAKENING?
What conclusion can be drawn?
We are witnessing what some church analysts describe as Europe’s great awakening.
European documents alone will not change the position of the Russian Orthodox Church. They do, however, reflect an important shift in perception. Religious institutions that were once viewed almost exclusively through the prism of freedom of religion are increasingly being examined from the standpoint of national security, foreign influence, and hybrid threats.
European policymakers are moving beyond simply condemning the war toward recognizing the Moscow Patriarchate as an ideological ally and co author of the Russian regime. As a result, the role of the Russian Orthodox Church is now being incorporated into documents addressing transnational repression.
This is no longer merely a series of isolated political statements. It represents a gradual transformation in the underlying logic of the European approach toward the Russian Orthodox Church.
This change in approach is likely to become one of the most enduring consequences of the current phase of confrontation between Russia and Europe.
Anna Jansone for Alpha
